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We analyze a proposed reform of the German law concerning the adequate com-
pensation for employees’ inventions.1 The current law, as well as the proposed
reform, requires employees to report to their employer any invention made in
relation with the work contract. If, under the current law, the employer claims
the rights to the invention, then he is obliged to ﬁle for a patent and to pay a
compensation to the employee. This compensation is subject to negotiation, yet
the parameters that are relevant for bargaining are regulated by accompanying
legal rules.
The old law has often led to legal action between the two parties. The fed-
eral Government has amended the law with guidelines for the determination
of an adequate compensation.2 Even though these guidelines are not binding,
many ﬁrms seem to comply with them.3 Therefore, the reform proposal aims
at introducing a clearly deﬁned compensation scheme. It shall consist of two
components: ﬁrst, the employer is supposed to pay a ﬁxed compensation, the
amount of which is independent of the project value; second, the employee is
eligible for a share of the project value if it exceeds a threshold value eight
years after the invention. This payment scheme is mandatory; deviations are
only allowed as far as they consist of higher payments to the employee. Thus,
contracting around, is prohibited even if the parties had an incentive to agree
upon lower payment components.
Contractual provisions like this are observable at several U.S. universities.4 Ger-
1“Gesetz ¨ uber Arbeitnehmererﬁndungen” (ArbEG). The draft of the proposal was pub-
lished by the German Federal Department of Justice on October 25th, 2001, in German
language, download under http://www.bmj.bund.de/images/10333.pdf.
2Richtlinien f¨ ur die Verg¨ utung von Arbeitnehmererﬁndungen im privaten Dienst, July 20,
1959, BAnzg. Nr. 156, modiﬁed on September 1, 1983 (BAnzg. Nr. 169); online available
under http://transpatent.com/gesetze/rlarberf.html.
3The guidelines propose to take into account three criteria: the compensation should be
low if the employee a) holds a position in which making inventions is a part of his job proﬁle,
b) has made use of many resources provided by the employer whereas his own contribution
of knowledge is relatively small, or c) holds an intermediate position in the hierarchy of the
employer’s ﬁrm. See Kesten (1996, 657), who gives an extensive and critical analysis of the
guidelines. See also Reimer/Schade/Schippel (2000) for the lawyers view on the law and the
guidelines.
4Cherensky (1993) discusses such pre-invention agreements in the light of “personhood”
theory. In particular, he stresses the fact that employee inventors often receive only a “token”
payment in exchange for the transfer of their property rights in their future research. For an
extensive discussion of employee inventions in the US see Merges (1999), who presents legal
and economic arguments to derive his insights, however without a rigorous contract theoretical
analysis. According to Eisenberg (2002, 4), patenting activities of US universities are mainly
concerned with biomedical research.
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empt from the obligation to report their inventions to their universities, which
had no right to the inventions. This privilege was based on the constitutional
right of scholars to their research results.6 The reform of this part of the old
law has already been decided upon in the German Bundestag.7 From now on,
German scholars have to report their inventions to their universities; if the uni-
versity claims the right on the invention, it has to ﬁle for a patent. Apart
from employees outside the universities, scholars receive a compensation that
amounts to 30 percent of all returns.
There is an enormous body of literature concerning patent law in general.8
Most of these contributions focus on the problem of optimal length and breadth
of patent rights.9 The longer and wider the patent right, the more incentives
are provided for the inventor, but the larger is the ex-post ineﬃciency due to
the monopoly position granted to him. A broader patent right may dampen
the incentives to develop complementary products or further inventions which
are based on the previous one.10 Other papers derive empirically to which ex-
tent patent rights have led to an increase in the value of products or ﬁrms.11
Meurer (1989) and Crampes/Langinier (2002) have focused on the enforcement
of patent rights in court. According to the latter paper, the detection of patent
infringement is a pre-requisite for bringing suit, and requires costly market ob-
servation.
In this paper, we leave these questions out of focus. We only want to discuss the
incentive eﬀects created by the employers’ property rights to their employees’
inventions on the one hand, and the compensation scheme the employers have
to pay to the inventors on the other hand. Our model draws on principal-
agent theory, combining elements of moral hazard and hold-up. We derive a
unique eﬃcient payment scheme that consists of a lump-sum payment only. We
5See §§42 f. of the ArbEG.
6Art. 5 III of the German Constitution.
7“Gesetz zur ¨ Anderung des Gesetzes ¨ uber Arbeitnehmererﬁndungen”, Bundesgesetzblatt
Teil I, Nr. 4, January 24th 2002. The initiative of the Federal Government is published as
Bundestags-Drucksache 14/7565, Nov. 23rd, 2001, http://www.ipjur.com/data/1407565.pdf,
which is identical with the initiative of the parties that support the Federal Gov-
ernment (Social Democrats, Green): Bundestags-Drucksache 14/5975, May 5th, 2001,
http://www.ipjur.com/data/1405975.pdf.
8See, e.g., Kitch (1998) for an overview.
9See Klemperer (1990). Gallini/Scotchmer (2002) presents an overview over alternative
means for the protection of intellectual property rights.
10See Scotchmer (1991) and (1996).
11E.g., Schankermann (1998). Lanjouw/Pakes/Putnam (1998) have developed proxies to
measure patent values.
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been made provides ineﬃcient incentives for the employees to spend eﬀort on
inventions.12
Our analysis, based on rigorous economic theory, also allows more diﬀerentiated
results than those presented in Brockhoﬀ (1997). He argues informally that
“collective regulation” (by legislation) is neither necessary, nor eﬀective in order
to motivate employees to make inventions. Individual agreements or collective
agreements (on the ﬁrm level) are preferable.13 According to our model, an
ex-ante agreement is necessary to implement eﬃcient eﬀort. Negotiations over
the compensation after the invention already has been made put the employer
into a hold-up position. If this is anticipated by the employee, his incentives to
spend eﬀort on making the invention in the ﬁrst place are suboptimal.
Our results are very similar to those derived in Scotchmer (1991) for the case
of upstream and downstream inventions. According to this paper, to pro-
vide proper incentives for the upstream inventor requires him to be granted
with a share of the value of the downstream invention.14 From the viewpoint
of the Property-Rights theory, however, this assignment of property rights to
several persons might cause an “Anti-Commons” problem, as pointed out by
Heller/Eisenberg (1998).15 Our solution does not lead into this problem, since
the property rights are, in each stage of our game, exclusively assigned to either
the employer or the employee.
In the second section of this paper we introduce the notation of our model. Its
key assumption is that the employee’s eﬀort increases the (unobservable) success
probability of an invention project, whereas the employer’s input may increase
the ﬁnal market value of a successful project.
We ﬁrst derive, in the normative part of our analysis, the socially optimal eﬀort
of the two parties and demonstrate under which conditions the optimal solution
is the equilibrium of the two games we analyze. This normative result serves as
a benchmark, neglecting the interaction structure that determines the payment
parameters.
Having done this, we focus on the conﬂict and the possibly arising ineﬃciencies
between employer and employee. In this positive part of the analysis, we set
12Thus, our model follows the view of Kitch (1977, 265) who points out that the function
of the patent law is to increase the output from resources devoted to technological invention.
13See Brockhoﬀ (1997, 685).
14See Scotchmer (1991) and (1996).
15See also Heller (1998) and Hardin (1968). While a “Commons” problem is characterized by
ineﬃcient over-usage, an “Anti-Commons” is likely to be under-used in an ineﬃcient manner.
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ﬁrst of these games refers to the reform proposal and the new law concerning
university scholars. In this model, the payment scheme is ﬁxed ex ante when the
interaction starts. The goal of this analysis is to derive the payment parameters
that implement ﬁrst-best eﬀort. In the second game, which reﬂects the situation
under the old law, the parties negotiate about the compensation scheme after
the invention has been made.
In section 3, we discuss to which extent the results of our analysis had to be
modiﬁed if some of the assumptions made in section 2 were relaxed (in particular
the two-sided risk-neutrality). In section 4, we apply the theoretical results
to the reform proposal concerning employees in general, and to the new law
concerning university scholars in Germany. In section 5, we draw conclusions.
2 The model
2.1 Outline
We consider an interaction between two players, the employee (denoted as E)
and the Firm (F) that has employed E.16 The timing of events and actions is
as follows:
1. E decides about his eﬀort, denoted as e with e ∈ [0,1], to spend on a
research project.17 Eﬀort increases the probability of success, but burdens
the employee with cost, denoted as c(e), with c(0) = 0, dc/de > 0 for e > 0,
dc(0)/de = 0, and d2c/de2 ≥ 0.
2. A chance move decides whether the project is successful or not. The
probability of success is denoted as p(e), with dp/de > 0 and d2p/de2 ≤ 0.
Thus, the probability of an unsuccessful project is 1 − p(e). In this case
the game ends.
3. If the project turns out to be successful, then F decides whether to claim
the invention or not. If not, then the game ends.
16Subsequently, we categorize the ﬁrm F as female, and the employee E as male.
17Note that our model is not only applicable to the case of an employee who does research
as his main job. It also covers the case of an employee who makes an invention by chance,
but has to spend some eﬀort in order to evaluate what he has discovered. His outside option
would be to simply neglect the discovery.
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the project (and thereby to further increase its value). We denote this
eﬀort as f, with f ∈ [0,1], and the value of a successful project as Y (f),
with Y (0) > 0 and dY/df > 0 ≥ d2Y/df2. Y (0) is the value of a successful
project that E is left alone with.18 F’s eﬀort raises cost, denoted as k(f),
with k(0) = 0, dk/df > 0 for f > 0, dk(0)/df = 0 and d2k/df2 ≥ 0.
Thus, we assume that Y (f), k(f), p(e), and c(e) are twice diﬀerentiable and
continuous. The above assumptions guarantee that both parties’ eﬀorts cause
convex cost and a concave output. The output generated by E’s eﬀort is the
success probability, and the output generated by F’s eﬀort is the additional
project value. Both of these outputs contribute to an increase in the expected
project value. The diﬀerences Y (f) − k(f) and p(e) − c(e) are both concave
functions. Figure 1 demonstrates examples for the assumed input and output
functions of the two parties.
























Y (f), k(f), p(e), and c(e) are assumed to be common knowledge,19 whereas
the eﬀort decisions of both parties are observable by them, but not veriﬁable.
Contractual payments, therefore, can not be made contingent on actual eﬀort.20
18Even though we assume Y (0) to be clearly positive, our models would also allow to derive
results for a low value of Y (0) or even for the case Y (0) < 0.
19Uncertainty about the project value is discussed in section 3.
20Strausz (1999) proposes a mechanism that implements ﬁrst-best eﬀort in sequential part-
nerships with observable, but non-veriﬁable eﬀort. In his mechanism, the partners provide
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expected monetary payoﬀ.21 If the project is not a success, then the parties’
payoﬀs amount to −c(e) for E and 0 for F. If the project is successful, and F
does not claim the research results, then the payoﬀs are Y (0) − c(e) for E and
0 for F.22
In case of a cooperation between F and E, the parties’ payoﬀs depend on the
payment F has to make in order to obtain the project results. We limit our
view to payment schemes that consist of two components:
• a contingent ﬁxed payment (denoted as Φ), which is independent of the
project value as realized by F’s actually chosen eﬀort, but will only be
paid if the employee has made an invention,
• and a share of the ﬁnal project value (denoted as α, with α ∈ [0,1]).
Thus, the payoﬀs of the parties in case of cooperation are αY (f)+Φ−c(e) for
E and (1−α)Y (f)−Φ−k(f) for F.23 In the subsequent analysis, we distinguish
three ways for determining these payment parameters:
• in section 2.2 we derive the ﬁrst-best eﬀorts, neglecting possible conﬂicts
between E and F as well as the actual structure of the interaction;
• in section 2.3 we derive the payment parameters that implement the ﬁrst-
best solution under the assumption that these parameters are set exoge-
nously (either by a third party like a regulator, or by an ex-ante agreement
between E and F);24
• in section 2.4, we assume that the parties negotiate over the payment
eﬀort that increase output. In our model, the employee’s eﬀort does not contribute to the
project value, but to the probability of a success. Therefore, his mechanism is no applicable
to the problem introduced here.
21In section 3, the impact of risk-aversion is discussed. Risk-neutrality on the side of the
Firm provides the justiﬁcation for our simplifying assumption that Y (f) is deterministic. If
the project value were a random variable, the risk-neutral ﬁrm would simply calculate with
the expected value.
22We simplify the analysis by assuming that the product market situation of F is not aﬀected
negatively if E makes use of his outside option. We discuss the impact of this eﬀect on the
respective equilibria of the games in section 3.
23Thus, it is assumed that motivation is mainly extrinsic. See Orbach (2002, 93) for a
discussion of intrinsic motivation in the context of employees’ inventions.
24In this paper, we do not analyze how the payment parameters are set in advance, since
we limit our view to the interaction, given these parameters. For now, we would simply
assume that the parties or the regulator have incentives to choose the payment parameters
that implement eﬃcient eﬀort.
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during stage 3 of the interaction described above.
2.2 First-best solution
In this section we derive the socially optimal eﬀorts for F and E, i.e. the eﬀort
choices that maximize the joint payoﬀ. The decision of player F to purchase
the results of E’s research has no impact on the maximum social value of the
project: if F’s eﬀort is productive, then social optimality would require her
investment to be made, regardless of who owns the project returns. The social
value only depends on the employee’s investment into the success probability
and the ﬁrm’s promotion of the project value. As the (expected) social beneﬁt,
we deﬁne the sum of the parties’ payoﬀs, irrespective of the positive analysis of
the interaction. We denote the expected social beneﬁt as
Σ(e,f) = p(e)[Y (f) − k(f)] − c(e).
A combination of the two parties’ eﬀorts is optimal, if this expected social beneﬁt
is maximized. We label the optimal values of e and f with an asterisk:
(e∗,f∗) = argmaxΣ(e,f).
Therefore, e∗ and f∗ satisfy the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
dc(e∗)/de
dp(e∗)/de








The concavity assumptions made above guarantee that second-order conditions
are satisﬁed. Furthermore, they imply our ﬁrst (partial) result:
Proposition 1: e∗,f∗ > 0.
Proof: Follows directly from our assumptions, since the initial
marginal costs are zero, whereas the initial marginal values are pos-
itive.
According to this proposition, cooperation between the parties is socially de-
sirable. This implies that, even under the rather general assumptions we have
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strategic considerations, the parties should always be able to beneﬁt from an
agreement.
Note that, if the condition (2) is fulﬁlled, this does not imply that F actually
claims the project and chooses her optimal eﬀort. Even if her contribution to
the project value is socially desirable, her individual incentives may keep her
from doing so. Her actual decision only depends on her incentives and not on
the social desirability of her options.
2.3 Equilibrium if payment is exogenously given
In this section, we assume that the payment components α and Φ are set ex-
ogenously. This can have been done by, e.g., a collective wage agreement or by
governmental regulation. Figure 2 visualizes the interaction. At the beginning
of the game, the players E and F know the exogenous values of the payment
parameters α and Φ. First, E chooses the eﬀort e, then “Nature” (N) chooses
the success of the project. In the case of success, F decides whether to buy or
not, and in case that she has bought the project, she chooses her eﬀort f. This
model can be interpreted as a stylized generalization of the situation under the
reform proposal as well as under the new law concerning university employees.
It is a generalization since the law and the proposal specify speciﬁc payment val-
ues, while our model allows to derive the payment parameters that implement
the optimal eﬀorts.
In the previous section we have already demonstrated that cooperation between
E and F is eﬃcient. F will actually choose “buy” if her payoﬀ from doing so
is non-negative. Thus, we only have to derive the payment parameters that
implement eﬃcient eﬀort choices, provided F chooses cooperation. Proposition
2 states the conditions under which optimal eﬀorts (as derived in the previous
section) are implemented, i.e., E chooses e∗ and F chooses f∗.
Proposition 2: If the payment parameters are exogenously given,
then α = 0,Φ = Y (f∗)−k(f∗) is the unique parameter combination
that implements the ﬁrst-best solution (e∗,buy,f∗).
Proof: See Appendix.
We call the expression Y (f) − k(f) the “net value of F’s contribution”. If
F chooses eﬃcient eﬀort, then the net value of her contribution is Y (f∗) −
9
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[αY (f) − c(e) + Φ,(1 − α)Y (f) − k(f) − Φ]
k(f∗), which equals the value ﬁxed bonus parameter Φ that implements eﬃcient
eﬀort on E’s side.25 According to Proposition 2, the payment parameters (α,Φ)
implement eﬃcient eﬀort if the variable component α equals zero (hence, it is
desirable that F is put into the role of the residual claimant), and if the ﬁxed
payment component Φ equals the net value of F’s eﬃcient eﬀort. The eﬃcient
ﬁxed component is, thus, independent of the parties’ actual eﬀort choices (e0,f0)
and of the actually realized project value Y (f0). It is exogenously determined
(by the derivatives of the Y and k functions) which level of the ﬁxed payoﬀ
component is eﬃcient. Even though Φ∗ is a ﬁxed payment in the sense that
it is independent of the actual eﬀort or project value, E will only receive it if
the project turns out to be successful. Thus, it is a bonus (rather than a ﬁxed
wage). In the framework of our game, E receives nothing if his project is a
failure.
One of the results in Proposition 2 is not surprising at all, namely the one
25Note that Y (f) − k(f) is not the rent generated by the cooperation between F and E.
The cooperation rent is Y (f)−k(f) net of the opportunity costs of the cooperation, i.e., Y (0)
(while c(e) is already sunk).
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out to be successful, then E takes over the role of the principal in a principal-
agent-relationship with F. Then, F is the agent who needs incentives to spend
eﬃcient promotional eﬀort. In such a simple principal-agent setting with two
risk-neutral actors, a “sell the shop” contract is clearly eﬃcient. This contract
is realized by setting α = 0, since this makes F the sole residual claimant of the
project.
A bit more surprising is the result according to which a unique value of the con-
tingent ﬁxed wage exists. This result is due to the fact that our model addresses
a two-sided incentive problem. If only F’s incentives were to be considered, then
any ﬁxed wage would be eﬃcient as long as the two parties’ participation con-
straints are obeyed. It is the opportunity to make a take-it or leave-it oﬀer
that allows the principal to claim the whole cooperation rent by setting a neg-
ative ﬁxed wage.26 In our model, it is necessary for eﬃciency and not due to
bargaining power that the bonus payment transfers the complete value of F’s
contribution to the principal E.
A straightforward corollary of Proposition 2 is that the principal E collects the
highest possible payment if α and Φ are set eﬃciently. Any α 6= α∗ would
implement less than eﬃcient eﬀort on F’s side, which leads to a smaller than
eﬃcient net value of F’s contribution, Y (f∗) − k(f∗). This net value is the
maximum possible ﬁxed payment, since F would otherwise choose not to buy
the project. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: If Φ < Φ∗ and α > α∗, the total payment to E is
smaller than under the eﬃcient payment parameters.
Proof: Straightforward.
2.4 Equilibrium if parties bargain over payment
Now we analyze the case in which the payment components α and Φ are subject
to negotiation after E has spent his eﬀort, and after the project of E has turned
out to be successful. This is a stylized model of the situation under the old
German law.
26Inderst (2002) points out that the ﬁrst-mover advantage is an assumption according to
which the bargaining power is assigned to the principal only. The paper relaxes this assump-
tion in the context of a hidden-type model.
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[αnY (f) − c(e) + Φn,(1 − αn)Y (f) − k(f) − Φn]
Figure 3 visualizes this interaction. At the beginning of the game, E chooses
eﬀort e and “Nature” (N) chooses the success of the project. In the case of
success, E and F bargain over the payment scheme. We employ the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution, according to which the parties share the net beneﬁt
of an agreement evenly. If an agreement is closed, then F may decide upon
her eﬀort f. We denote the equilibrium strategy proﬁle as (en,αn,Φn,fn).
Proposition 4 states the predicted result for these negotiations.
Proposition 4: If the payment parameters are subject to bargain-
ing, then the parties choose αn = 0, fn = f∗. The predicted contin-
gent ﬁxed payment component then is
Φn =
Y (f∗) − k(f∗) + Y (0)
2
(3)
and en satisﬁes the condition
dc(en)
de
! = Φn (4)
Proof: See Appendix.
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successful invention Y (0) on the bargaining result: the higher Y (0), the greater
Φn. Furthermore, even if the stand-alone value Y (0) is only zero, E would still
achieve a positive bargaining result, due to the assumption of equal bargaining
power. Thus, even in this case E would have an incentive to spend positive eﬀort,
since the marginal costs of zero eﬀort are assumed to be zero: dc(0)/de = 0.
2.5 Comparison of the results
Obviously, it is possible for either a regulator or the parties of an ex-ante agree-
ment concerning α and Φ to implement the ﬁrst-best eﬀort. To determine the
equilibrium payment scheme via negotiations, however, appears to be even more
demanding. Proposition 5 demonstrates that the eﬃcient outcome is unlikely
to occur if the payment parameters are subject to negotiations.
Proposition 5: If the parties negotiate about the payment scheme,
then the negotiated variable payment is eﬃcient (αn = α∗), whereas
the negotiated contingent ﬁxed payment is smaller than the eﬃcient
one, i.e., Φn < Φ∗.
Proof: see Appendix.
According to Proposition 5, the agreed upon contingent ﬁxed payment Φn would
only be greater than (or equal to) the ﬁxed payment that implements eﬃcient
eﬀort e = e∗ if the net gain derived out of F’s contribution were negative, in other
words: if cooperation between E and F is not beneﬁcial. In such a case however,
there will be no agreement between the parties concerning a cooperation in the
ﬁrst place.
On the contrary, if the contribution of F to the project’s value is beneﬁcial, then
the agreed upon wage Φn is smaller than the eﬃcient Φ∗. Note that this result
would also be true if the asymmetric Nash solution were applied, as long as the
agent F has at least some bargaining power. Only in case the bargaining power
of F is zero,27 negotiations over Φ would lead to the eﬃcient solution. The eﬀect
on E’s eﬀort choice is described in Proposition 3.
Proposition 6: If the parties negotiate about the payment scheme,
then the eﬀort of E is suboptimal low (en < e∗).
Proof: straightforward consequence of Propositions 2 and 4.
27Which is highly unlikely.
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negotiation result (αn = 0,Φn < Φ∗). While the exogenously given payment
scheme can be set (by ex-ante agreement or by law) such that ﬁrst-best eﬀorts
are implemented on both sides, the freedom to negotiate over the payment
scheme will lead to a suboptimal payoﬀ on E’s side. Therefore, the freedom to
negotiate leads to a smaller social beneﬁt, compared to a world in which the
payment scheme is ﬁxed before E chooses his eﬀort.28.
3 Discussion
The previous analysis is based on some quite restrictive assumptions. In this
section, we want to discuss the extent to which the derived results would be mod-
iﬁed if these assumptions were relaxed. We start with allowing for risk-neutrality
(which may become particularly relevant if the project value is stochastic in-
stead of deterministic), then we examine the impact of a product market eﬀect
in case the employee makes his invention available to a competitor of his em-
ployer, and ﬁnally we discuss second-best solutions in case the employer also
spends eﬀort ex-ante, or the employee also spends eﬀort ex-post.
3.1 Risk-neutrality
We have assumed both parties to be risk-neutral. In principal-agent models,
the employee is often modeled as the (more) risk-averse party. If the employee
is the agent (and not the principal, as it is the case in our model), then the
introduction of risk-aversion makes it harder, if not impossible, to specify a
ﬁrst-best contract.
In the context of our model, this problem plays no role. If we would introduce
risk-aversion on E’s side, our results were only reinforced. Recall that E is the
principal, not the agent in the subgame that starts after an invention has been
made. Thus, the more risk-averse E, the more desirable it is to sell the residual
claim to F. Incentives to spend eﬀort and risk-allocation aspects work towards
the same direction in our model, as far as the variable payment is concerned.
Risk-aversion on E’s side, however, would have an impact on our result con-
cerning the eﬃcient bonus payment Φ. This bonus is contingent on E’s research
eﬀort e being successful. If he fails to generate an invention, he receives zero.
Thus, the bonus payment exposes E to the full risk. If E was risk-averse (and F
28This result is similar to the one in standard hold-up or renegotiation models.
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would be better oﬀ by receiving a ﬁxed wage which is independent of the suc-
cess of the project. This would reduce E’s risk, but may distort his incentives
to spend eﬀort.
A further modiﬁcation would be the introduction of a stochastic project value.
Then, Y does not only depend on F’s eﬀort, but also on a random variable.
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality, F simply calculates with the expected
project value. Thus, her decision situation is unmodiﬁed. With respect to her
eﬀort f, it would be eﬃcient to make her the residual claimant. However, a
stochastic project value Y (0) has an impact on the bargaining situation of a
risk-averse E: the outside option of E would be less attractive as it is in the case
with a deterministic project value. E would deduct a risk premium from the
expected project value generated without an agreement. This implies a lower
threat point on E’s side in the Nash product, which leads (c.p.) to a lower agreed
upon ﬁxed payment. The more risk averse E, the greater is the ineﬃciency of
the Nash bargaining solution.
3.2 Product market eﬀect
Our result that the Nash bargaining solution leads to an ineﬃcient outcome is
based on the assumption that the ﬁrm receives zero in case of a non-agreement
(which we have made for the sake of simplicity). Whereas this assumption
does not inﬂuence the Pareto-eﬃcient solution, it has an inﬂuence on the Nash-
bargaining solution.
However, F’s position in the product market could be deteriorated if a competi-
tor makes use of E’s invention. This has an impact on her payoﬀ in case of a
non-agreement: F’s outside option is negative instead of zero. This increases
the agreed upon bonus payment, yet not necessarily to the eﬃcient level. It can
even be the case that the product market eﬀect leads to a bonus payment that
is higher than the eﬃcient one.
3.3 Ex-ante eﬀort by F or ex-post eﬀort by E
We have assumed that F only spends eﬀort after the invention has been made
(and after he has claimed the invention). This assumption neglects that F may
also make ex-ante investments, such as providing a laboratory, which increase
the probability of success or the project value. If the ex-ante eﬀort of F and E
15
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extended game. In such a subgame, it would therefore still be eﬃcient to put
F into the position of the residual claimant, and to distribute the project value
among the parties by a bonus payment to E. The higher this bonus payment, the
more eﬀort is spent by E during the ﬁrst stage of the game, while this decreases
F’s incentives to spend initial eﬀort. The output of the ﬁrst stage is the success
probability of the project. Thus, there is no way to induce eﬃcient eﬀort (at
least not with a budget-balanced sharing rule).29 At best, a second-best eﬃcient
bonus scheme could be derived that minimizes the ineﬃciency.
Furthermore we have assumed that only F can increase the project value after
the invention has been made. The model could also be modiﬁed by taking into
account that E might as well spend ex post eﬀort to foster the project value.
Then it would not be eﬃcient to assign the residual claim to F. Even in the
framework of our simple model, with a deterministic project value, no budget
balanced sharing rule exists that motivates both parties to spend eﬃcient ex-
post eﬀort, unless the parties are risk-averse.30 With sequentially invested ex-
post eﬀorts and veriﬁable output, Strausz (1999) has demonstrated a mechanism
that implements ﬁrst-best eﬀort.31 If both parties can contribute to foster the
project value, then the payment scheme should distribute the residuum among
them, which would make it necessary to decrease the (success contingent) ﬁxed
payment to E. Thus, it might be impossible to implement ﬁrst-best eﬀorts in
such a situation.
4 Analysis of the German reform proposal
In this section, we make use of the results derived in section 2 above, and
evaluate the two German legal reforms under scrutiny: the proposed reform of
the complete law on employees’ inventions, concerning employees in general, and
the new legislation concerning university employees only. The latter has already
passed the German Bundestag. Compared to the old law, both these reforms no
longer require the parties to negotiate about the compensation, which is clearly
an advantage in terms of eﬃciency. However, the payment parameters set are
suboptimal in both cases.
29See Holmstrom (1982).
30See Holmstrom (1982) and Rasmusen (1987).
31L¨ ulfesmann (2002) has analyzed the sequential team problem for stochastic output.
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According to the draft of the legislative proposal that was published by the
German Federal Ministry of Justice, an employee who makes an invention has
to reveal this to his employer. If the employer claims the rights to the invention,
the employee is entitled to a ﬁnancial compensation in three steps:
1. 750 Euro immediately;
2. 2,000 Euro 3.5 years after the employer has claimed the invention;32
3. a share of the returns if the project exceeds a threshold value.33
Leaving aside the fact that the ﬁxed payment is due in two parts, it amounts
to 2,750 Euro in case the employer makes use of the invention. This contingent
ﬁxed payment will be paid only if an invention is actually made and is indepen-
dent of the actual project value. It is also independent of the net value of the
employer’s eﬀort. However, as we have shown above, the eﬃcient ﬁxed wage
equals just this net value: Φ∗ = Y (f∗) − k(f∗).














32If the employer has claimed the invention, but does not make use of it, i.e. if he stores it
as a business secret, then the employee is entitled to an additional payment of 500 Euro only.
33Returns greater than 5,000,000 Euro, or proﬁt greater than 125,000 Euro eight years after
the invention was claimed.
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project value is determined by the function Y2(f), while project 2 is described
by Y2(f). For simpliﬁcation, the slopes and F’s costs k(f) are identical, thus in
both cases, the optimal eﬀort of F is f∗. The only diﬀerence is that the ﬁrst
project value exceeds the second. From eﬃciency point of view, the bonus for
researcher 1 should exceed the bonus for researcher 2, since Φ∗
1 = Y1(f∗)−k(f∗)
is greater than Φ∗
2 = Y2(f∗) − k(f∗).
Obviously, the eﬃciency criterion would be met by the legal provision only in
very exceptional cases. In most of the cases, the bonus payment prescribed by
the law will either exceed the respective eﬃcient one, or be too small. Let us
brieﬂy discuss the three possible cases of a mandatory bonus Φ0 in the above
example:
a) Φ0 < Φ∗
2: F receives both projects for a payment Φ0.
b) Φ∗
2 < Φ0 < Φ∗
1: F buys project 1 for a bonus payment Φ0, whereas she
rejects the other project.
c) Φ0 > Φ∗
1: F rejects both projects.
In the framework of our model, it is ineﬃcient, however, if F rejects a project,
since her the eﬃcient contribution is positive (see Proposition 1 above). In
cases a) and b), F would buy both or at least one of the projects, if successful.
However, the mandatory bonus only induces ineﬃcient small eﬀort on E’s side.
Should F consider to pay a higher bonus in order to make E work harder?
A closer look on the incentive situation of F makes clear, however, that the
voluntary payment of a higher bonus is unlikely.
Paying the mandatory bonus, F’s expected payoﬀ is positive. Even with ineﬃ-
cient (but positive) eﬀort of E, the probability of a success is positive. In case
of a success, F may retain a positive share of the project value. If she would
pay the eﬃcient bonus, i.e. the net value of her contribution, then her expected
payoﬀ would be zero. Thus, she has no incentive to pay the eﬃcient bonus.
Nevertheless, F may have an incentive to pay voluntarily a higher bonus: if she
is residual claimant (α = 0), then F chooses ˆ Φ to maximize
p(ˆ e)[Y (f∗) − k(f∗) − Φ]
subject to two constraints: the bonus has to exceed the mandatory one, i.e., ˆ Φ ≥
Φ0, and E chooses his payoﬀ as a reaction on F’s choice of Φ: ˆ e = argmaxp(e)Φ−
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assumptions made in section 2, a positive relation exists between the bonus
and E’s eﬀort choice ˆ e: dˆ e/dΦ > 0. Then, F’s maximization problem can be
rewritten as
ˆ Φ = argmaxp[ˆ e(Φ)] · [Y ∗ − k∗ − Φ]






[Y ∗ − k∗ − ˆ Φ] = p[ˆ e]
As long as Φ0 < Y ∗ − k∗, situations exists in which this condition is fulﬁlled,
hence an interior solution exists with ˆ Φ > Φ0. However, as argued above, ˆ Φ is
always smaller than the eﬃcient bonus Φ∗ = Y ∗ − k∗.
The proposal provides a third payment component, which adds another distor-
tion: The employee is entitled to a share of the project returns. Even though the
occurrence of this share is uncertain, the expected value is positive and therefore
exceeds the eﬃcient share (α∗ = 0). A positive share of the (expected) returns
induces the ﬁrm to spend less than eﬃcient eﬀort. Furthermore, we have demon-
strated in our Proposition 3 that E’s payment is necessarily smaller than the
optimal contingent ﬁxed wage if the parties deviate from the optimal payment
scheme. Thus, E’s incentives to spend eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage are distorted as
well.
Three aspects, however, suggest a qualiﬁcation of these unambiguous result
concerning the reform proposal:
• The old law frequently led to costly litigation. The reform proposal pro-
vides a redress for this drawback, since the payment components are ex-
actly deﬁned. A clear standard, even though it may be ineﬃcient in most
cases, at least avoids litigation costs. It is left to empirical research to
demonstrate which eﬀect outweighs the other: the ineﬃciency of the stan-
dard or the saved litigation costs.
• If the success of a project also depends on ex-ante eﬀort of the employer,
then a suboptimal low bonus Φ can be second-best eﬃcient. The diﬀerence
Φ−Phi∗, which the employer retains, creates an incentive for her to spend
ex-ante eﬀort.
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above), then second-best eﬃciency may require a decrease in the bonus
and a (higher) ﬁxed wage that is independent of the project success in
order to reduce the employee’s exposition to risk.
4.2 The special law concerning university employees
The current German law contains a privilege concerning inventions made by
university scholars. According to this rule, professors did not have to announce
their inventions to their employer, the university. In particular, the university
did not have any right to the invention.
Even though the reform proposal discussed above has not been brought into the
German parliament yet, a law on this particular privilege has passed the German
Bundestag recently. The new regulation provides a right for the universities to
any invention made by university employees (not only scholars), and introduces
a payment scheme that is diﬀerent from the one for employees in general. The
employee receives 30 percent of the returns, and no ﬁxed fee.
In the terms of our model, the new law sets Φ = 0 and α > 0.3 since it expressly
refers to the returns, not the proﬁt. According to our analysis, this implements
too little eﬀort on the employers side: f < f∗. In addition to this, Proposition 3
demonstrates that the incentives for the employee are suboptimal as well, since
the resulting payment will be smaller than the eﬃcient ﬁxed fee.
The new law would deserve a more favorable judgement if university scholars
can contribute ex-post eﬀort to the promotion of the invention. In our analysis
above, we have assumed that it is only the employer who increases the project
value. If the employee’s eﬀort is also relevant in this stage of the game, then
the payment scheme should provide incentives for him as well as for the ﬁrm.
However, according to the literature on university inventions, this is not com-
pelling. University scholars appear to be rather unaware of how to create (or
increase) the value of their inventions.34 Moreover, even if the scholars are able
to contribute to the project value, it is still to be proven whether a variable
payment α = 0.3 is (second-best) optimal.
The main reason why the Federal Government brought forward this legal ini-
tiative was its concern that the number of patents, compared to the number of
inventions made at the universities, is too small nowadays. Two reasons for this
34See Brockhoﬀ (1998).
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the shift of property rights shall induce them to build up such institutions. If
patent ﬁles are a matter of scale economies, then this idea may lead to eﬃciency.
Another problem addressed by the new law is the observation that researchers
often have no interest in ﬁling for a patent, but rather want to publish their
results in scientiﬁc journals. The German patent law35 prohibits patents from
being issued if the idea has already been published, because publication turns
it into “state of the art”. Thus, if they want to ﬁle for a patent, the universities
would need, in principle, to prohibit prior publication by the researchers.
However, the German constitution grants researchers a basic right to their sci-
entiﬁc results.36 The shift of the patent rights to the universities itself is not
considered a violation of the researchers constitutional rights, whereas an ob-
stacle for publication would certainly be one. Therefore, the new law tried to
balance the interests of the universities and the researchers by introducing an
elaborate system of time limits: the researcher, having announced his publica-
tion to his university, has to wait two months before submitting his results to a
scientiﬁc journal, which gives the university time for evaluation of the project
and ﬁling of the patent.37 This procedure intends to make both ﬁling for patent
and scientiﬁc publication of the results possible.
The explicit intention of the new law is to increase the number of patents.
However, the incentive structure of the new law leads to ineﬃcient eﬀort. Thus,
the total number of inventions may decrease, and the total number of patents
may decrease even if the rate of patents increases substantially.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed a sequential interaction between an employee E (who is en-
gaged in research and may produce an invention) and an employer F (who may
purchase the invention in case of a successful project). We have distinguished
two institutional settings, namely exogenously ﬁxed payment schemes vs. nego-
tiation over payment after the project has turned out to be successful. As the
starting point of our analysis, we have set up a simple principal-agent model
35§3 German patent law
36Art. 5 III of the German Grundgesetz.
37See the proposal made by the legal committee of the German Bun-
destag, published as Bundestags-Drucksache 14/7573, Nov 26th, 2001,
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/075/1407573.pdf.
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have derived the optimal variable payment to E (the principal) that implements
the optimal eﬀort of the agent F. In both cases, the optimum is zero. Thus, an
optimal contract puts the employer into the position of the residual claimant.
The right to the residual income motivates her to spend eﬃcient eﬀort on the
promotion of the invention, which generates the maximum cooperation rent.
However, the two legal institutions under scrutiny are clearly diﬀerent with
respect to the ﬁxed payment and the eﬀort of E in the respective equilibrium.
Under the negotiation rule (and this result is also true in case of re-negotiation
over exogenously ﬁxed payments), both the agreed upon ﬁxed payment and E’s
eﬀort are predicted to be smaller than optimal.
Thus, the optimal contract between employer F and employee E should give F
the residual claim to the project value. This motivates F to invest eﬃcient eﬀort
into the promotion of the project, which generates the maximum cooperation
rent. E should receive a ﬁxed fee (in case of a successful invention) that equals
the net value of this cooperation rent. Neither a variable payment, nor ex-post
negotiations implement eﬃcient eﬀort on both sides.
Modiﬁcations of our starting model may lead to partly diﬀerent results:
• The introduction of risk-aversion on the employees’ side even reinforces
our results if project value is modeled stochastically. The extent of the
ineﬃciency is even greater under the
• Within the framework of the old law, the bargaining result may be less
ineﬃcient as indicated by our analysis if a product market eﬀect exists.
A product market eﬀect is a decline in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt if the employee
moves on to a competing ﬁrm which makes use of his invention. Lower
proﬁt translates into a negative threat point, and thus a higher willingness
to pay, on the side of the ﬁrm.
• The mandatory bonus provided by the new law can be lower than the eﬃ-
cient one. However, this can be second-best eﬃcient if a ﬁrst-best solution
is not attainable, maybe for risk-aversion on the side of the employee, or
if the employer can also contribute ex-ante eﬀort to increase the success
probability.
• A positive variable payment can only be second-best optimal if the em-
ployee can also contribute ex-post eﬀort to increase the project value.
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and the proposed one concerning employees in general, have a tendency to
set ineﬃcient incentives for spending eﬀort into inventions. Thus, the German
government might fail to reach its goal, namely to increase the number of patents
in Germany.
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Proof of Proposition 2
When choosing her eﬀort f, F solves the following maximization problem:
max
f
(1 − α)Y (f) − k(f) − Φ














Comparison of the ﬁrst-order condition with equation (2), i.e. equation (2),
shows that f∗ is implemented if, and only if, α = 0.
F prefers buy over not buy if, and only if, (1 − α)Y (f) − k(f) − Φ > 0. Given
α = 0, this implies that
Φ < Y (f∗) − k(f∗)




p(e)[αY (f∗) + Φ] − c(e)







The second-order condition Φd2p/de2 − d2c/de2 < 0 guarantees a maximum.




Comparison of this expression with equation (1) demonstrates that E is moti-
vated to spend optimal eﬀort if, and only if, Φ = Y (f∗) − k(f∗), q.e.d.
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Given a bargaining result (αn,Φn), F solves the same maximization problem
as demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 2. Thus, it is only αn = 0 that
would implement optimal eﬀort f∗. Hence, the bargaining problem is reduced to
determine Φn. Given α = 0, the symmetric Nash bargaining solution maximizes
the Nash product
[Φn − c(e) − Y (0) + c(e)] · [Y (f∗) − k(f∗) − Φn − 0]
which can be reduced to [Φn − Y (0)][Y (f∗) − k(f∗) − Φn]. The ﬁrst-order
condition for a maximum is
[Y (f∗) − k(f∗) − Φn]
! = [Φn − Y (0)]
which is equivalent to Φn = 0.5[Y (f∗) − k(f∗) + Y (0)], q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that, according to Proposition 2, the optimal eﬀort e∗ is implemented
if, and only if, Φ∗ = Y (f∗) − k(f∗). Recall furthermore that, by assumption,
Y (f∗) − k(f∗) > Y (0), which implies Φ∗ > 0. The comparison of the results in
Propositions 2 and 4 therefore yields Φn < Φ∗, q.e.d.
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In Germany, employers can claim the right to any invention made by their
employees, but they have to pay a compensation if they do so. Recently, this
compensation has been the subject of a legal reform proposal and a new law
concerning university employees. In this paper, we set up a simple principal-
agent model to analyze the current law, the reform proposal and the new law.
Our model allows us to derive a unique eﬃcient payment scheme that consists
only of a ﬁxed bonus which is contingent on the project value. We show that
the freedom to negotiate over the compensation after the invention has been
made (as it is provided by the old law) creates ineﬃcient incentives. Eﬃciency
requires the compensation to be ﬁxed ex-ante, as it is provided by both the
proposed law (concerning employees in general) and the new law (concerning
university scholars). However, both set the payment schemes ineﬃciently way.
With suboptimal incentives to spend eﬀort on inventions, the government’s goal,
an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed.
In Deutschland haben Arbeitgeber ein Recht auf jede Erﬁndung, die ihre Ar-
beitnehmer im Rahmen des Dienstverh¨ altnisses machen. Wenn sie dieses
Recht wahrnehmen, m¨ ussen sie jedoch eine Kompensation zahlen. Diese
Rechtslage ist vor kurzem durch ein neues Gesetz f¨ ur Hochschulangestellte re-
formiert worden. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir mit Hilfe eines simplen
Prinzipal-Agenten-Modells das alte Recht, das neue Gesetz sowie den ausstehen-
den Reformvorschlag (der sich auf Arbeitnehmer ausserhalb der Universit¨ aten
bezieht). Wir leiten her, dass ein eﬃzientes Kompensationsschema nur aus
einer Bonuszahlung besteht, die auf den Projekterfolg bedingt ist. Wir zeigen,
dass die unter dem alten Recht n¨ otigen Verhandlungen ¨ uber erfolgreiche Pro-
jekte ineﬃziente Anreize erzeugen. Nur eine vorab festgelegte Verg¨ utung - wie
sie im neuen Gesetz und im Reformvorschlag vorgesehen ist - kann eﬃzient sein.
Dennoch setzen beide Novellierungen ineﬃziente Anreize. Daher ist es m¨ oglich,
dass das Hauptziel der Reform, mehr Patente aus Universit¨ aten zu gewinnen,
verfehlt wird.
En Allemagne, l’employeur peut revendiquer le droit d’exploiter toute invention
faite par l’employ´ e, ` a condition toutefois de lui verser une compensation. Le
versement de cette compensation a fait r´ ecemment l’objet d’un projet de loi
et d’une nouvelle loi applicable aux employ´ es des universit´ es. Dans cet article,
nous proposons un mod` ele de principal-agent, aﬁn d’analyser la loi actuelle, le
projet de loi et la nouvelle loi. Notre mod` ele permet de d´ eﬁnir un syst` eme de
paiement ` a la fois unique et eﬃcace, articul´ e autour d’un bonus ﬁxe d´ ependant
de la valeur du projet. Nous nous proposons de d´ emontrer que le syst` eme actuel,
qui laisse aux parties la libert´ e de n´ egocier la compensation apr` es que l’invention
a ´ et´ e faite, est ineﬃcace sur le plan incitatif. L’eﬃcacit´ e passe par la ﬁxation
ex ante de la compensation, conform´ ement au projet de loi - concernant les em-
ploy´ es en g´ en´ eral - et ` a la nouvelle loi (applicable aux chercheurs universitaires).
Mais les syst` emes de r´ emun´ eration inscrits ne sont pas eﬃcaces. En l’absence
d’incitations ´ economiques suﬃsantes, il est peu probable que le gouvernement
atteigne son objectif, qui est d’accroˆ ıtre le nombre des brevets d’invention.
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